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JAPAN IN THE ORIENT

II. RELATIONS TO CHINA

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The relations of Japan to China can never be in many important respects similar to those which for more than a half-century have been establishing themselves between Japan and Korea. The bare thought of China being to any considerable extent permanently annexed to Japan, or otherwise absorbed in Japan, or of the establishment of an effective protectorate by the latter country over the former could scarcely be seriously entertained by any one superficially, not to say thoroughly, acquainted with the two countries. The very bigness of an empire which contains one-fourth of the entire world's population would be quite sufficient to give pause to any attempt at enforcing either of these forms of race development, even by the combined efforts of all the nations now allied with Japan. But aside from mere bigness, and what is of even more significance, there are elements of permanent strength and tenacity of purpose and endeavor in the Chinese nation, which never belonged in any corresponding degree to the Koreans. It is customary among the self-appointed defenders of the Chinese Empire against "the insidious attacks of aggressive Japan" to remind us that, in the past, China has, by her peaceful methods and her superior development in the industries and arts of peace, finally conquered those who have temporarily conquered her by force. But the argument would probably not hold, if put to the test by a nation allied in modern ways with a development of those industries and arts which is much superior to that of the Chinese.

Neither those who excessively admire nor those who despise the traditional ways and present attainments of China in comparison with those of Japan are altogether in the right.

China has, however, on a larger scale and to quite as debasing and dangerous degree, some of the characteristic weaknesses which cost the Koreans their independence when brought into conflict with the greater strength of the Japanese. The same infamous system of squeezes, the same overpowering influence from corrupt officials who enjoy preferred relations with the central government, the same unpatriotic alliances between native and foreign greed, and the same practical indifference of the Court to the condition of the common people in the provinces, in spite of repeated recitals in speech and written essay of the maxims (*sic*) of Confucius and Mencius—all of which prevailed until the very last in Korea—have been prevalent for centuries in China. These evils are prevalent in scarcely diminished form at the present day. No mere changes in the form of government, and no schemes for reforms as framed in the minds of Chinese young men (schemes for sudden wonders and efforts of the kind prized by the so-called “jingos” among all nations) whether they belong to the modern student and professedly Christian classes, or not, will save China from the inevitable results of these weaknesses, if the weaknesses themselves go forever, in fact, uncorrected. It is in the industrious and economical peasant classes, and in the industrious, frugal and honest tradesmen and makers of wares, that the unconquerable forces to resist all successful foreign aggressions on the economic side, chiefly reside. And it is on the increasing number of educated men, young and old, who see the dangers ahead, and are willing to work self-denyingly and patiently to correct the moral and social evils which threaten the dangers, that the solid hopes of great improvement are based. For there is much practical wisdom in China; and there are latent ideals which may be inspired to give concrete forms to the adaptation of Western ideas.

Nor have the methods practiced by China in conducting her relations with those foreign countries which have forced

upon her such relations been as yet essentially changed by years of unfortunate experience. Like both the "Old Japan" and, more recently, Korea, the Chinese Empire to the last days of its wretched existence desired chiefly to remain free of all connection with foreigners except such as was of a character limited to a few ports where affairs could be controlled exclusively in the interests of a select class of their own merchants and officials. The conception as it was proclaimed in the Imperial Rescript on which the "New Japan" was founded, of the benefits of a free and fair interchange of commodities, ideas and institutions, between themselves and the peoples of other countries, has never dawned on the Chinese mind. It has not yet been grasped or welcomed by the vast majority of the Chinese. The attitude of the millions of China toward foreigners of all nations and classes is still one of distrust and hatred. It cannot reasonably be assumed that the people are any less ready to be excited to the indiscriminate murder of foreigners than they were during the Manchurian dynasty; or more particularly, at the time of the Boxer movement, which is now well known to have been fostered by the then ruling government. Moreover, this attitude of suspicion and of smouldering hatred is being deliberately nourished, against other foreign nations—ourselves included—but especially against the Japanese, by *German* influences which are still very powerful and unceasingly active pretty well throughout China. When then, we ask ourselves to remember what happened in China in 1900, we do not put the question to arouse unjustifiable suspicion but only with a view to anticipating and forestalling the dangers with which the situation is already pregnant.

The attitude of the people of China at large toward foreigners in general has traditionally been, and it still is, made more inflammable and dangerous by being coupled with the grossest and most absurd superstitions. With a people, the very essence of whose religion, not as a theoretical and other-worldly affair, but as a matter of practical import for every detail of the daily life, is some form of demon-worship, the conduct which we consider most reason-

able and imperative, because most in accordance with natural law and selective experience, is interpreted by these superstitions in incredible and sinister ways.

Under these debasing influences the policy of China has for several centuries been most disastrous to herself and most provocative of resentment from all the foreign nations who have come into any close relations with her. To be sure, it is eminently true, as we are so accustomed to hear—in the form of accusation rather than the form of confession: The fault has always largely been with these foreign nations themselves. No one of them has by any means always treated China fairly, not to say, altruistically or benevolently. Fair treatment has not always been accorded, even by the teachers of foreign religions, to the so-called “heathen Chinese.” But all this does not remove the burden of responsibility for its shifty and iniquitous foreign policy from the shoulders of the Chinese Government. It might truthfully be said that the only alternative in dealing with this government has always been either to threaten it with a show of force or not to attempt to deal with it at all. Its traditional foreign policy has been, almost if not quite down to the present hour, a mixture of arrogance and weakness, of cunning and silliness, of vexatious delays followed by sudden and unexpected outbursts, of more or less successful attempts to play off the jealousies and conflicting interests of different foreign nations against one another; and of illicit bargains concluded, concealed, and then when the convenient time came, denounced. This course has not, however, resulted from a total lack of officials trained and admirably fitted for the enactment of a more honorable and ultimately profitable foreign policy. For China has always had a fairly creditable supply of the official classes to whom her dealings with foreign nations might safely have been entrusted. But honesty and real ability have seldom or never been able to retain favor with the corrupt Court at Peking, where almost without cessation, the most important affairs have ultimately been determined by the too often infamous favorites among the eunuchs and among the concubines and other court women.

It was this patent fact upon which the "Old Buddha," when dying, laid the woes of China; and she certainly knew what she was talking about, for China had seldom or never suffered more severely in this way than during her own reign.

It is not, however, in the power of an improved Confucianism, even could its doctrines be applied to the *personnel* and the management of the Tsung-li Yamen, or the more modern Wai-Wu-Pu, to afford safe conduct to China's ship of state through the troubled waters of its present and prospective storms. To admit this it is not necessary entirely to agree with the view of Dr. Griffis in his article on "China and Japan" in the *Americana* (vol. iv); it is necessary only to apprehend the essential truth which is expressed by this article.

"Until," says this authority, "Western diplomatists discern that China is a church nation. . . . with a fixed creed, upheld by the government and maintained by force, and that China always has been, and still is, a persecuting nation, there can be no sound diplomacy. . . . The maintenance of this dogma by the sword of the normal magistrate, himself *ex officio* an orthodox Confucian, has been the cause of persecutions during the ages with bloodshed abundant. This is the real reason of so many reactions and of so many disappointments. China has again and again raised hopes amongst Occidental peoples that she was about to modify her laws and people, only to dash the expectation of optimists to the ground."

After maintaining that there has been no real and radical change of policy in the twentieth century, the same writer goes on to say:

Whatever modifications China has made in her system are as yet simply external, nor will there be any real progress in the western sense of the word until Chinese bigotry and persecution are abandoned, and the union of church and state given up.

The idea that the fundamental difficulty with China in its relation to all internal reforms, and as well, in its attitude toward foreign nations and toward all fair and friendly intercourse with them, is its centuries-old "union of church and state" will, indeed, seem peculiar to many readers. But that its practical Confucianism is a curse rather than

a blessing for the people at large, and an obstacle to right and safe relations with all foreign governments, and that it can be broken down only by a species of foreign interference which has a certain show of force behind it, we think there can be no reasonable doubt. This Oriental country will never be reformed, or modernized, except through foreign help, the acceptance of which, and the guaranty of the success of which, must be somehow enforced. *China, whether called Empire or Republic, and whether ruled under the name of Kwang-Su or of Yuan Shi Kai, will not come of her own free will into the comity of nations.*

Those who imagine that China can be redeemed, and made fit for intercourse with the Western world by the planting and nourishing of Christian institutions within her borders alone, forget these three important truths. First: Conventional and institutional Christianity has not yet succeeded in so purifying the internal politics or modifying the selfish foreign policy of the nations of Europe and America as to commend it to China as a prompt and complete cure for all her own internal ills and foreign difficulties and dangers. Second: The educative work of the principles of the religion of Jesus—and this is by no means the same thing as conventional and institutional Christianity—is essentially a very slow growth; and it does not usually show itself first or chiefly in the cabinets and councils of empire or republic; or in the treaties and conventions, or even in the customs, which regulate the foreign relations of different nations. And, third: The very planting and early growth of the most peaceful and unsuspicious forms of Christian educative influences cannot be secured in China, much less permanently maintained in China, without aid from skilled diplomacy, backed up by firm and wise but essentially kindly display, and if need be, efficient use, of force.

In a word then: *China offers an enormous problem in race development, where external compulsion however necessarily unwelcome is absolutely essential.* Left to herself in the future, as she has so largely insisted on being in the past, there is absolutely no reasonable prospect of any large and essentially redemptive changes taking place among the four-

hundred millions of people calling themselves Chinese. The outside world must help in the attempt at the better solution of this enormously difficult problem. And the world cannot expect that all of its attempts at help, however well meant, will be welcomed or appreciated by either the Chinese common people or their official classes. On the contrary, some of the wisest and most benevolent of these attempts must expect for a long time to come, to be misunderstood and resisted, if they are not brought speedily to a disastrous end by the prevailing brigandage, rebellions with their accompaniments of looting, arson, rapine and murder, and the customary squeezes and corruption of the local and central governments.

All this complication of difficulties respecting China's foreign relations is more eminently true today than it has ever been before. But today there are spots of spreading light, and promises of reasonable hopes, as never before. For the knowledge of the outside world, and a spirit of relatively sincere patriotism, are being awakened throughout all China, as never before.

Our general survey has been so extended in the wish that it might help to a better understanding of the part which Japan is entitled to play—or, at least, thinks herself entitled to play—in the securing, not only of her own interests but also of the interests common to herself and China; and, in a word, in the solution of the enormous problem in race development offered by China and by the Orient at large. The most superficial but honest attempt to understand both Japan and China in their present relations and attitudes toward each other requires, moreover, some knowledge of the history of these relations in the more recent past.

The great debt which Japan owes to China for her own development in language, literature, and the arts, and also in the social and political customs and institutions which have their roots in, and derive their formulas from, the Confucian ethics, no intelligent Japanese would wish to deny. It is not necessary in the present connection even to rehearse in the briefest way what that debt is. All know it in the large, who know any thing about the two

countries. There are two things, however, which should be said to modify very widespread but false impressions. The Japanese have never been mere borrowers from China—or, for that matter, from any other nation. On the basis of what they have received from China—and, as well, from everywhere else—they have developed a language, a literature, an art, and a system of social and political practices, quite peculiarly their own. There is no more reason to call the Japanese mere imitators than to call ourselves this; perhaps there is even less good reason. Still further, in some of the more essential features of race development and of progress in national life, the Japanese have from time immemorial been greatly the superiors of the Chinese. Indeed, in some of the more important factors of their own characteristic development, the Japanese are not so much like Oriental China as they are like mediaeval Christian Europe. The most prominent of these characteristics center about the Japanese form of feudalism. And of these, the most important is that extreme form of personal fidelity to the liege lord, which in modern Japan has blossomed into the splendid flower of Japanese patriotism. Of patriotism, as the Japanese understand it, there has hitherto been an almost complete absence in China. Even today the millions of Chinese common people do not particularly concern themselves with the form or the *personnel* of the central government, if the squeezes are not too exorbitant and the local magistrate is made in a way responsible to their complaints.

But Japan's earlier, more cordial and completer entrance into the life of the modern Western world has hitherto—whatever its later results in certain directions may turn out to be—strengthened it against the weaknesses of China. In aggressiveness, force, promptness to meet emergencies, and unity of national purposes, we have again the case of a stronger nation endeavoring to take in hand a weaker nation, under a claim, either specious or genuine, to be aiming at the common good.

For a considerable time before the China-Japan war the relations of the two countries were far enough from being

satisfactory, not to say, friendly. The provocation on China's part habitually arose from her vacillating and irresponsible way of interpreting her claims to suzerainty. To cite a sentence quoted with approbation by Brinkley:

So long as her own advantage could be promoted, she regarded as a token of vassalage the presents periodically carried to her court from neighboring states; but so soon as there arose any question of discharging a suzerain's duties, she classed these offerings as an insignificant interchange of neighborly courtesy.

In a word, she insisted on saving her face, without being willing to pay the cost of the cosmetics. This practice—to go no further back—was illustrated in an extremely irritating way by the so-called Ryūkyū complication in 1876. In that year the system of government inaugurated in Japan proper was extended to the Ryūkyū Islands, and a local governor was established there. China at once entered a protest claiming that the territory was under her rule, and instanced the habit of bringing presents to the Court at Peking in proof. But it was an established matter of history that for fully two centuries, these Islands had been included in the Satsuma fief; and that China had made no protest, but had, on the contrary, virtually acknowledged the fact. When each of the two nations was pressing its claims to a point where peaceful relations were coming to be in jeopardy, it was General Grant who, in his tour around the world, suggested a compromise which resulted in China's protests being "pigeon-holed."

Our own government had already had a taste of the Chinese method, a full decade before. In 1866 the American schooner *General Sherman* had been destroyed by the Koreans. But when representations were made to the Chinese Government, the Tsung-li Yamen admitted that a sort of dependency of Korea upon China had existed from ancient times; but it would not admit any kind of responsibility for Korean acts, and denied in express words its right to control or interfere in either domestic or foreign Korean affairs.

It was the same thing carried out through years, and in much more provoking and really dangerous ways, which

resulted in bringing on the war of Japan with China. On the establishment of the "New Japan" an envoy was sent to Korea to announce the change and to confirm friendly relations between the two states. Under the baleful influence of China the Korean Court refused to receive the envoy's message, or even in any way to recognize him. During the events of 1866 and the following years, China did not hesitate to interfere in the strife between the Shogunate and the Imperial party, but secretly sold arms to the former. The Chinese also engaged in the trade of kidnapping and selling the children of indigent Japanese. Peaceful envoys sent to treat with Korea were, through the influence of China, treated in the customary contemptuous and insulting way; and in August of 1875 a Japanese man-of-war which had put into the harbor of Chemulpo for fuel and water was fired upon by the Koreans.

To Marquis Ito, who remained to the end of his life an almost extreme "pacifist," it seemed now that the only hope of ever establishing reasonably friendly relations between Japan and Korea lay in the direction of making the latter country independent of the incalculable and unprincipled claims of suzerainty made by China. This was nominally accomplished by the treaty of 1876. It is an interesting fact, communicated to the writer by Durham White Stevens, that Count Inouye, who was to negotiate this treaty, called on our minister, Mr. Bingham, and borrowed Bayard Taylor's abridged history of Commodore Perry's expedition, on the plea that he wished to know how the better to play the difficult part before him by a renewed study of the book. Other nations followed the example of Japan in recognizing the independence of Korea, including our own government, which appointed General Foote as the first American minister to Korea.

But China did not change its policy; and in 1882, in connection with its armed interference in a domestic quarrel between the wife and the father of the Korean emperor, a number of Japanese were killed and the Japanese minister was chased from the capital and obliged to put to sea in a fishing boat. Two years later, the Japanese minister, who

had transmitted a message from the Emperor of Japan remitting the indemnity for the former outrage, was himself obliged to flee from Seoul on account of the perpetration of even greater outrages. At this time a Chinese force had taken up permanent quarters in extensive camps within the walls of Seoul; had erected a fort close by the palace gates and two outside of the city; and had increased their number to no fewer than 3000 men. That these Chinese troops were behaving toward Koreans and Japanese alike, as Chinese government troops have always behaved, and do still almost invariably behave, we have the report of Ensign Foulk to our own government, for believing. On the contrary, the same authority speaks of the behavior of the Japanese in the most flattering terms.

Plainly, the Japanese Government was more than sufficiently justified in bringing to an end every shade and form in practice of China's intolerable interference in Korean affairs under its fictitious and absurd claim to suzerainty. Whether from considerations of policy or from principle, Japan had been conspicuously mild in its dealings with Korea and with China in Korea. But when the populace of Seoul, in conjunction with the 3000 Chinese troops, after murdering indiscriminately all the Japanese they could reach, attacked the 143 Japanese soldiers defending the Legation, and drove them through the West Gate down to Chemulpo, after which they looted and burned the Legation, the most pacific party among the Japanese could not well do otherwise than consent to having more decisive measures taken than had hitherto seemed to the nation at large to be demanded.

Count Inouye was sent to Seoul to conclude a convention with Korea, and to see to it that its terms were definitely accepted and guaranteed in some kind of perpetuity by China. A picturesque narrative of the audience of the Count with the Korean Emperor was at one time given to the writer by Mr. Stevens, who accompanied Inouye and was eye-witness to its several interesting and amusing particulars. The Korean ruler tried to save his own face before his own subjects, and also to gain favor with China,

by opening only one of the side gates to the Ambassador of Japan, until he was assured that Count Inouye, as representative of His Imperial Majesty of Japan, could go in to audience with the Korean Emperor only through the center gate. And later, during the audience, when the Chinese Consul General of a name now most powerful in the Orient, coolly assumed the right to attend the audience as the representative of China, Count Inouye warmly resented the interference and threatened to break off the negotiations. Whereupon the lieutenant of Li Hung Chang, now the President of the Republic of China, retired discomfited.

It was in the Spring of 1885 that Marquis Ito had his first important meeting with Li Hung Chang, of whom he used always to speak to me as "my friend Li," and who was then Viceroy of Chi-li. This meeting resulted in the signing, on the 18th of April of that year, of a Convention which was intended to put an end to all dangerous controversies between Japan and China over Korea. It would have had this highly desirable effect, if China had not promptly followed its customary unscrupulous disregard of all treaty obligations. This agreement provided that both China and Japan should have equal rights to send troops into Korea, if *necessary to guard the country against foreign intervention as the result of domestic intrigues*; but that neither should thus intervene without the consent and coöperation of the other. We note in passing that both countries recognized the danger to both from foreign interference; and that they also recognized the necessity of standing together to resist such interference. *And these two considerations are the principal ones to bear in mind in estimating all the present policies of China and Japan touching their relations to each other and to all other foreign nations.*

It cannot be said that the war of Japan with China had quite the same kind of justification as the war with Russia. The war with China was not so strictly a defensive war. As we have shown in a former article, the war with Russia was forced on Japan as almost immediately necessary if it was to preserve its national supremacy, or even its national integrity, from imminent peril. Perhaps, even if

China had been allowed again to revive its definitely relinquished claims to control over the affairs of Korea, and to violate with impunity or even without being called to account, the Convention with Japan made in 1885, Japan would have continued to exist for an indefinite time with its then territory unimpaired, and its peaceful expansion not checked in a serious way. Yet even this is by no means a political certainty. To quote again from Captain Brinkley:

On Japan's side, also, the Korean question caused much anxiety. It was impossible for the Tōkyō statesmen to ignore the fact that their country's safety depended largely on preserving Korea from the grasp of a Western power. They saw plainly that such a result might be expected at any moment, if Korea was suffered to drift into a state of administrative incompetence.

Although there had been, at the hands of China, an almost uninterrupted series of rebuffs and humiliating interferences in the peaceful intercourse of Japan with Korea, armed resentment leading to war did not occur until the time of the Tonghak rebellion. But now, with the avowal of the nominal purpose to quell this rebellion, Peking gave notice that she was sending troops to Korea, her "tributary state;" Japan gave corresponding notice on her own part; and thus in July, 1894, a Chinese force was encamped at Asan and a Japanese force in the vicinity of Seoul. And when Japan proposed a peaceful union with China for the purpose of restoring order in Korea, China contemptuously refused, declined to come to any understanding, persisted in despatching more troops, not only by sea but also by the way of the Yalu River; and three of its warships, conveying a transport with twelve hundred soldiers on board, met and opened fire on two Japanese cruisers.

It is not our purpose to examine the reasons which might be alleged in justification of Japan for entering upon the war with China; it is not necessary or even helpful to that purpose to follow the course of the war until it shortly ended in complete victory for Japan and in the complete humiliation, but only very partial disillusionment, and scarcely at all in the correction, of the policy of the Chinese government. All this is fairly well known, and is by no means as

yet ancient history. But before passing on to the most recent of the dealings of Japan with China, it is worth while to pause in the narrative and emphasize four considerations, exceedingly important but too often either overlooked or totally forgotten.

First: All three of the foreign wars in which Japan has found herself engaged have been, considered as to their ultimate and underlying causes, due to the weakness and corruption of China. In the case of the war with China herself this connection between cause and effect is most direct and obvious. It was China's persistent policy of using her claims to suzerainty over Korea to stir up trouble for Japan, which several times went to the length of not only shedding Japanese blood but even of driving out with violence the representatives of the Japanese Government, while at the same time disclaiming all responsibility for Korea's actions, that brought on this war. Indeed, in the worst of these acts of arson and bloodshed, Chinese soldiers took the prominent part.

The responsibility of China for bringing on the other two wars was scarcely less real, although less direct and obvious. But, in fact, the weakness and corruption of the Chinese Government were the primary sources of both the Russo-Japanese war and of the recent attack upon Germany in China. In the earlier case, the highest officials, including the Empress Dowager and Li Hung Chang, had conspired against the interests of the people of China and against the interests and safety of the Japanese Empire, by putting into the hands of Russia the control of a large territory, and of enormous mining and other resources, in Manchuria and outer Mongolia. From this time on, Chinese inability to resist the encroachments of Russia, and Chinese greed combined with Russian greed, as organized in the Russo-Chinese Bank, the Yalu Timber Company, and other similar enterprises, made inevitable a defensive war for Japan.

Later, by threats which worked through this same impotency, rather than through its customary accompaniment of corruption, Germany obtained a valuable "concession"

from China, and immediately proceeded to enlarge, develop, and fortify, its territorial encroachment on the Chinese Empire, with the quite evident intention of holding it against all comers for all time. Germany began at once, moreover, making only too evident her intention not to be satisfied with what she had already extorted, but to seize the first and every following opportunity for extorting more. Thus Japan's not unnatural bitterness of feeling toward Germany, and her quite reasonable fear of having a strong Western power dominating her weak neighbor, gave zest and insistence to her duty to her ally, Great Britain, in the capture of Kiao-Chau.

But the second consideration is more important and fundamental still. It is this. The superficial and temporary interests of the two nations, Japan and China, seem to be antagonistic; but the most essential and permanent interests of the two nations are largely similar, if not absolutely identical. Succinctly stated, they may be summed up in the following way: To preserve the economic resources, social and political institutions and their development, of the Orient, by the Orient, and for the Orient, free from the aggressions and domination of Western nations, so far as their essential features and essential advantages are concerned. Both Japan and China imperatively need much that only the Western nations can give to them. Japan from the very beginning of its new era has officially, so to say, recognized this need. The Kagoshima and Shimono-seki expeditions, following upon the lesson which Commodore Perry had inaugurated, taught the Japanese their powerlessness in the face of Western armaments. Japan has never forgotten that lesson. China is, after a more prolonged and bitter experience, even today only slowly and reluctantly learning the same lesson.

Moreover, the necessity of a more truly, and yet constitutionally limited and restricted, admixture of democratic government has been learned, so far as its essential features are concerned, and has on the whole been put into fairly successful practice, in Japan. China is just in the birththroes of the nation which has, in common with all the na-

tions of the earth, to learn by practice this perilous but indispensable lesson. Many really democratic institutions, centuries old and almost universally observed throughout China, will be of the greatest assistance while she, too, is learning how to govern herself. And yet no one can predict the success of the present experiment in China.

Again: Japan has become able to guard her own territory and to secure it and its resources against wily and unscrupulous foreign thieves, with their plausible schemes of promotion and threats of interference on the part of the "Home Government," if their "rights" are not properly respected. Japan has also, established the same control over such matters in her Province of Chosen. But China is as yet too weak, both financially and by way of armament on land and sea, to do the same thing for herself.

In brief, Japan has inaugurated and established in working order a constitution, a sound system of finance, and a fairly equitable system of taxation. China has as yet none of these things. She is surrounded, tormented, threatened and obsessed, by foreign promoters, would-be concessionaires, schemers for the possession and development of her enormous undeveloped resources, or for the extension of their own pet forms of foreign trade. Most dangerous of all, perhaps, are her coveted friends,—the foreign loaners of money who, naturally and even properly enough, are not going to part with their millions without a good return, and without a kind of security calculated to put the economical development and even the political control of China largely in their hands.

Japanese, whose interests in China are of the commercial and selfish sort, do not look with favor upon the prospect of other foreign nations getting the start of them in the way of appropriating the resources of China. But the better class of Japanese, among their political leaders and even among their business men, take a loftier and more far-sighted view of the situation. Even when making war upon China in 1894, these Japanese felt no ill-will toward the people of China. To take them at their word, as they then expressed themselves to the writer, they went to war mainly for the

purpose of arousing China and forcing her to learn the lesson which they felt so important, so essential for the welfare of both nations, to have learned by both,—thoroughly and before it was forever too late. It is that same lesson which they wish the Celestial Republic to “sit up and take notice of,” and learn today. For Japan cannot look upon any domination of China’s government through control of her resources, any aggression upon China’s territory, least of all, any armed seizure or fortified possession of a Chinese port, as otherwise than a serious menace to both these great nations in the Far East. In the far, if not the immediate future, it seems altogether likely that these two great nations, China and Japan, will stand together, or decline and fall together, before the encroachments of Western civilization.

The third consideration is more special and belongs in a more particular way to the present time. It is this. The present time is a critical time, but also a time of very special opportunity for the Far East. Europe will be for a generation at least—too busy with its own repairs to interfere forcefully in the structural development of Oriental affairs, if the Orient is agreed with itself. China is still dreadfully afraid of Germany. With German thoroughness in practical matters, the Chinese, who are themselves eminently practical, were much impressed while these foreigners were in virtual control of the peninsula of Shantung. They had good reason to know the weight of the German arm. They are still fearful that, at the close of the European war, Germany will come back upon them for the recovery of its lost possessions, for damages, and for more territory as compensation for the failure of the Chinese to defend their own lease. But the German Government makes no attempt to conceal its hatred of Japan, and its determination when it has dominated Europe, to rehabilitate itself in China and to punish Japan. Moreover, Germany is still largely in control of the Chinese Government, and by bribery, threats, and the pretense that the interests of the two nations are the same, is using its influence to discredit other foreign nations with China, and to excite suspicion and hatred toward

them all, including especially the United States and Japan. As to the nature of some of the German methods, the following extract from a reputable paper in the Far East may be read with confidence.

Exhaustive inquiries have established the fact that the recent demonstration held by 2000 Chinese students here (Tōkyō) concerning the Sino-Japanese negotiations owes its origin to an intrigue by Captain von Hintze, German minister to China. On the opening of the pending negotiations at Peking, it appears, Herr Hintze pointed out to President Yuan the advantage of causing Chinese students in Japan to raise an outcry against Japanese demands, and the latter was at last prevailed upon to send a secret instruction to his agents in Tōkyō. Expenses for the movement were defrayed by Messrs. Siemens-Schuckert, notorious in connection with the late naval scandals, at the instance of Herr Hintze, who feared that the defrayment of the money by the Chinese Legation might lead to the quick discovery of the intrigue. There are indications that some of the Chinese students who participated have come to suspect the machination and are now repentant of their thoughtless action. On the other hand, the secret agents of President Yuan are continuously holding conferences in the suburbs with a view to organizing a second meeting for demonstration.

Incredible as it might otherwise seem, there is evidence to show that during the siege of Tsing-tao, the Germans hired Chinese who, having their queues cut off, were impossible to distinguish from Japanese, to commit all manner of outrages against the Chinese of Shantung, in order to discredit the Japanese troops and to excite the fury of the Chinese against them.

Finally, as has already been intimated, the present time is from one point of view opportune, and from another point of view critical, for both Japan and China. The situation is opportune, for none of the governments of Europe, *as governments*, are in a condition to undertake active interference. But, the situation is critical; for, besides the German propaganda, which is going on in the Orient as elsewhere all over the earth, interested individuals are fostering the customary prejudices by misrepresentations through the press which they either subsidize, deceive, or otherwise influence, if not control. In this kind of work, subjects of the United States and Great Britain have been,

of late, especially persistent. All this has served to excite to haste and excessive pressure the naturally impatient, uncompromising and often exaggeratedly overwrought temperament of the Japanese; and, on the other hand, to emphasize the habitual shiftings and exasperating delays, subterfuges, and dishonorable resort to low intrigues, of the Chinese Government. Happily, however, the crisis seems now to have been past without a resort to violence, which would probably have discredited, if not disgraced Japan in the eyes of foreign nations, and would have added to the weakness and inability to self-reform, so characteristic in the past of China.

If now we combine these three groups of considerations, we may arrive at a point of view from which we can the better understand Japan's recent dealings with China, whether or not we can altogether approve of them. The most vital interests of both countries, and of the Orient generally, depend upon some sort of an arrangement by which China and Japan can stand together, and so enter into the comity of nations without having their economic resources appropriated by foreigners, their territories seized or divided into "spheres of influence" virtually under foreign control, or their peculiar social and political developments, and their philosophical and religious conceptions, degraded or ruthlessly invaded. This necessity China does not as yet in practical ways sufficiently recognize. She is still almost as incapable as ever, if left to herself, of economic and political reform. From the weakness and corruption of her government in the past, Japan has already suffered incalculably. But now Japan has extensive and valuable interests and rights, which, according to the customs prevailing in the civilized world, have been legitimately acquired, and which must be defended against China herself and against possible attacks by the Western nations in the future. And now is the hour, both opportune and critical, for a settlement of the relations between the two countries which shall be, not simply advantageous for Japan, but to the more ultimate advantage of China as well. Such was undoubtedly the attitude of mind in which the

Japanese Government forced upon Yuan Shi Kai the "Agreement" of last May 25th.

In one of last Spring's numbers of the *Shin Nippon*, Count Okuma, the then Premier, had an article on the kind of diplomacy which was needed henceforth for the defence of the dignity and prosperity of Japan. To quote from a summary of this article: after reviewing the history of Japan during the last half-century,—

Count Okuma comes to the conclusion that the history of Japanese diplomacy throughout the greater part of the Meiji era, was a series of helpless, disgraceful humiliations, which left an indelible impression on the minds of the Japanese that their country's foreign policy, to be respected and effective, must be backed up by powerful force. International compacts are based on a similar principle. . . . It is only ten or fifteen years since Japanese diplomacy began to carry weight with foreign countries; and it began from the time Western powers commenced to recognize Japan's military strength.

There is little doubt, the writer goes on to assert with authority, that at the present time the great majority of the most thoughtful and truly patriotic of the Japanese people, as well as of their rulers, while discrediting both the extremes of surrendering all rights "to the northward and advancing southward," and the jingoistic policy which advocates "making China a second Korea," feels that Japan "is bound to control Korea and keep Manchuria as her sphere of influence, and also establish her power in China." And, indeed, "that has been the national policy of Japan for the last thirty years."

And now in the light of these considerations let us look more closely at the so-called "Agreement" negotiated last May between Japan and China. To estimate this latest treaty, whether from the point of view of policy or of morality, it is necessary to remember that none of the possessions or rights held by the Japanese in China, belonged to China at the time Japan acquired them; much less were any of them wrested from China by force as so many of the similar acquisitions of other foreign nations have been. Neither the holdings in Manchuria nor those in Shantung were in Chinese hands, when Japan came into their possession as

the "spoils of war." To speak of China as "being despoiled" by Japan is, therefore, to use language inappropriate, nonsensical.

In her weakness and corruption of government, China yielded the Manchurian rights to Russia and the rights in Shantung to Germany. Japan acquired both, the one from Russia and the other from Germany, by great sacrifices of treasure and blood, which from her not unreasonable point of view were forced upon her. The rights and possessions granted by compact of China with Russia, and acquired by conquest from Russia by Japan, were subsequently confirmed to Japan by treaty with China. They are as legitimate as anything of the kind can possibly be. Indeed, the practical denial of such rights in general would necessitate a reconstruction of the map of the entire world—that of the United States included.

But Russia had only a lease of her holdings in Manchuria and not a fee simple—the latter title being something which it does not accord with the customs or the "face" of China to give to any foreign nation; and the lease was a comparatively short one. At its expiration, however, in order to resume full jurisdiction and virtual possession of her leased territory, China must pay over to the lessee all the vast sums spent on its improvements and developments, with interest, during the period of the lease. But especially since the acquisition of the Liaotung peninsula and of the railroad and mining and other properties in the other parts of Manchuria by the Japanese, through the treaty of Portsmouth, the values of all these properties, and of their accompanying rights, have been enormously increased.

Now there is not the slightest prospect that China, at the expiration of this lease as originally contracted, or at any time soon afterward, could raise at home by taxation or otherwise, the vast sum needed for taking over the holdings of Japan and Russia in Manchuria. Nor could such moneys be raised by negotiating foreign loans, at any time in the future and especially as monetary conditions are likely to be in the near future, without giving guarantees which would threaten the autonomy of China and the most vital financial

and military interests, if not the national safety of Japan. For these reasons Japan, and in less degree Russia, could not possibly fail to regard all proposals like that of Secretary Knox as disingenuous and unfriendly. Nor are these interests, as we have already intimated, merely of the lower commercial order; for Japan cannot let the Liaotung peninsula or her railroad properties and mining rights in Manchuria pass into foreign hands without endangering her very existence in its integrity, in the future. And to claim that America, or any other foreign nation, should share equally in these rights and possessions, can result only from ignorance or hypocrisy.

The case of the Shantung peninsula, although more recent and susceptible to misinterpretation in foreign quarters, is in its general features less complicated. In the politely sarcastic note of "advice"—reminiscent of the "advice" given by Germany to Japan, to surrender the territory in Liaotung and Manchuria acquired from China in the war of 1894-'95—Japan was reported to have promised Germany that, if she would surrender her possessions in Kiaochau, the territory which Germany had forced from China should ultimately be returned to its original owner. But the promise was made to *Germany*, who was the legal if not the morally rightful owner, and *not to China*, who had forfeited all legal and moral claim by the manner of its surrender. Germany did not accede to the proposal and so spare Japan the "cost in blood and money" of taking Kiaochau away from her. It does not then seem strange that Japan regarded China's demands for an immediate and unconditional return of her forfeited territory, together with all the expensive improvements made upon it, as the height of diplomatic arrogance and absurdity. Moreover, such generosity would be likely to turn out more damaging to China than to Japan. For, as has already been pointed out, German intrigue and the fear of German force, and the trick of playing off Germany and Japan against each other, are the winning cards in Yuan Shi Kai's foreign diplomacy. The cards are only newly shuffled and dealt differently: the

character of the game has been characteristic of Peking from time immemorial.

The main features of the recent negotiations of Japan and China touching the disposal of the Shantung peninsula seem, in the light of these considerations, to be eminently fair and reasonable.

The cardinal fact that Japan derives its claims in this part of Chinese territory to conquest in war from Germany is made fundamental in the treaty respecting Shantung province. Here the official English translation of Article I reads:

The Chinese Government engages to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government relating to the disposition of all the rights, interests and concessions which, in virtue of treaties or otherwise, Germany possesses *vis-a-vis* China, in relation to the Province of Shantung.

But it also provides that,

When, after the termination of the present war, the leased territory of Kiaochow Bay is completely left to the free disposal of Japan, the Japanese Government will restore the said leased territory to China under the following conditions:

1. The whole of Kiaochow Bay to be opened as a commercial port.
2. A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan to be established at a place designated by the Japanese Government.
3. If the foreign Powers desire it an international concession may be established.
4. As regards the disposal to be made of the buildings and properties of Germany and the conditions and procedure relating thereto, the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government shall arrange the matter by mutual agreement before the restoration.

But Article Three of this treaty goes still further in making provision for the "Open Door;" for it stipulates:

The Chinese Government agrees in the interests of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself as soon as possible certain suitable places in the Province of Shantung as commercial ports.

To these conditions is added the one most important of all for the welfare and safety of both China and Japan. Within the territory or along the sea coast—mainlands or islands—

of Shantung, no territory shall in the future be ceded or leased to a third power. This, of course, commits Japan to assist China, by her army and navy if necessary, against any attempt on the part of Germany to recover her hold on Shantung.

In the cases of the demands concerning East Mongolia, and the revised and increased demands affecting South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, the claims of Japan to have acted in all respects fairly and wisely in its dealings with China are by no means so clear. The diplomacy of neither Power has been throughout always wise and moderate; and the press in both countries—but especially in China under foreign influences—has excited the people of both, and has damaged the reputation of both in the eyes of the foreign world. China has continually made use of its customary dilatoriness and bad faith;¹ Japan at one juncture made a quite unnecessary and premature display of force by increasing suddenly her garrisons in South Manchuria and

¹Those who are familiar with the traditional ways of the Chinese Government will have little doubt of the substantial truthfulness of the complaint made in the Statement published by the Japanese Foreign Office on May 7, 1915, as follows: "The Imperial Government have, in the demands which were lately presented to the Chinese Government, made it their main object to adjust matters to meet the new situation created by the war between Japan and Germany, to bring closer the friendly relations subsisting between Japan and China, and thus to ensure the permanent peace of the Orient. They have, in formulating these demands taken special care to avoid those which might be deemed to conflict with the principles of territorial integrity, equal opportunity and 'open door,' which Japan has from time to time declared to the Powers with regard to China.

"With regard to the demands which were formulated after careful and mature consideration on the basis of the principles above referred to, the Chinese Government, in disregard of an understanding which was made at the commencement of the negotiations, to keep the proceedings of the conferences strictly secret, made public the Japanese proposals in various exaggerated forms and endeavored to stir up the feelings of the Powers against Japan; they invariably caused the matters discussed at the conferences to be published in newspapers with a view to hinder the negotiations; by fabricating news detrimental to Japan, they attempted to shake the confidence placed by her Ally (Great Britain) in Japan; they even demanded the unconditional retrocession of Kiaochau and indemnity caused by the war between Japan and Germany; and thus they showed a lack of sincere desire for a satisfactory conclusion of the negotiations."

North Chosen. Thus it was only when a deadlock was imminent, which would have been apt to terminate in action injurious if not disgraceful to both Powers, that both undertook the difficult task of "climbing down" to meet upon a lower and safer level of compromise.

Our sympathy, however, must be with Japan when she insists that her subjects shall have unimpeded rights to reside, travel, trade, and engage in industrial pursuits in Manchuria, while agreeing on her part to submit to the "police laws and ordinances and taxation regulations approved by China." Those who know the legal practice in China, when it is a case of a foreigner against a Chinese, if the former has no protection from his own government, will scarcely object to the provision that lawsuits between Japanese and Chinese, whether civil or criminal, shall be heard by Japanese consular officials in case Japanese are defendants, and by Chinese judicial officials when Chinese are defendants; with each side having the right to despatch delegates to hear the trial. In case of a "mixed civil suit between Chinese and Japanese relating to land," however, the case shall be jointly heard by Japanese consular and Chinese judicial officials, judgment to be given "in accordance with the Chinese law and local usage." This double arrangement is to prevail only until the judicial system in Manchuria has been suitably reformed, when all cases, both civil and criminal, shall "be tried and adjudicated entirely by Chinese law courts."

Nor do we see how any right-minded person can fail to sympathize with the effort, as yet unsuccessful, to obtain for Japanese the same right to practice their own system of education and religious worship which is enjoyed by the 12,000 Chinese now resident in Japan. It is pitiful to note in this connection that, if we may trust the published reports, some of the foreign teachers of religion in China have allowed themselves to be excited by this demand to a display of bigotry and unwisdom which excels anything to which we had occasion to call attention in the article on Japan in Korea. In this case also, the principal actors are said to be *American* missionaries. At any rate, articles have appeared

in the Chinese press, purporting to come from American missionaries, which have denounced this demand of Japan for freedom of education and religious worship as unfair and oppressive; and have even gone so far as to call upon the American Government to protest it, and in case its protest is not heeded, to refuse to loan Japan money, or otherwise to boycott it. The *Yen* 1000 cablegram which conveyed this remarkable message is now known to have been paid for by a Chinese official.

It would probably have been as well for the Japanese press to have dismissed this silly proposal of interference on the part of our government, as the scheme of some German, British, or American promoter—willing, as usual, to use a hypocritical pretense of interest in missions to further his own selfish interests; but if the Japanese press were to pay any attention to it, their answer was prompt and sufficient enough. Japan had been for fifty years protecting and in many instances fostering hundreds of missionaries, mostly Americans, and never a single martyr among them. China, on the other hand had murdered hundreds of missionaries and their converts. Japan is to-day standing for the same principle for which America has been traditionally standing, namely, religious liberty. And were the missionaries afraid to have Christianity compete with Buddhism before the intellects and consciences of a nation seeking modern enlightenment? Why, finally, were they taking upon themselves the business of political interference? To quote from a Japanese paper:

China has long suffered from the selfish incursions of Western foreign nations. In not a few instances the foreign demands the Peking Government has been forced to accept were far more unjust than anything Japan has ever attempted to present to China. Did the American missionaries ever raise any objections, in the behalf of China, to the demands made by other foreign governments? Are all things done by Occidentals right? And is Christianity such a one-sided religion as to discriminate between Occidentals and Orientals?

But these are questions which admit of only one answer; and the obvious answer to which does not greatly concern, or usually much affect, the tortuous course and final goal

of international diplomacy. And such intermeddling with the foreign diplomacy of the nation in whose land the foreign teachers of religion is tolerated has quite uniformly operated badly, if not disastrously, for both the father and the host of the foreign missionary.

The most important part of the Notes Respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia is that which has reference to the extension of the time of the leases in this territory. Of these Notes, No. 1 provides that the term of the lease of Port Arthur and Dalny shall expire in the eighty-sixth year of the Republic or 1997. And

the date of restoring the South Manchuria Railway to China shall fall due in the ninety-first year of the Republic or in 2002. Article 12 in the original South Manchurian Railway Agreement providing that it may be redeemed by China 36 years from the day on which the traffic is opened is hereby cancelled. The term of the Antung-Mukden Railway shall expire in the ninety-sixth year of the Republic or in 2007.

The reasons for the extension of these leases which lie in the economic and civil policy of Japan, and even as necessary to secure its rightful controlling influence over Korea, and in the Far East at large, are quite as obvious as those which certainly apply to the peninsula of Shantung. They are almost as obvious for the welfare of China, when we consider its present financial and military weakness, and the invitation which such weakness affords to the perpetually increasing encroachments of the Western Powers.

Provision is made, however, for opening an indefinite number of Commercial Ports in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, by China and under "regulations therefore drawn up by the Chinese Government itself"—"decision concerning the places to be made after consultation with the Minister of Japan."

The correct appreciation of many of the minor demands made upon China by Japan, whether these demands be regarded from the point of view of international custom or of morality, is not possible without an accurate and detailed knowledge of the geographical, economic, and political considerations governing the separate cases. For it is such

considerations as these which control both the essential value and the justice of these demands on the side of Japan, and also the essential expediency and fairness of accepting or denying them, on the part of China. In general, however, they are of such a character that the judgment of the civilized world would scarcely justify the stronger nation in forcing them by war, or threats of war, upon the weaker nation.

The demands to which we have just referred may be divided into two classes: those which secure special privileges and opportunities for Japan, and those intended to bar out other nations from aggressions in the future upon the territory or economic interests of China; or, perhaps in some cases, from the enjoyment of privileges and opportunities acquired through agreement with China. Of course, in certain instances both motives may coincide to the benefit of both China and Japan. Of the first class are special privileges in certain specified districts for the construction of railways, the working of mines, and the establishment of iron works. Under this head would come the option of financing, "if foreign capital is required" the construction of any railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia which China may wish to build in the future; the control and administration of the Kirin-Chang-Chun railway; the plan for a joint ownership, as a Chino-Japanese concern, of the Hanyeh-ping Company (iron, mining, and milling); and other joint enterprises in agriculture and auxiliary industries. The Note "respecting the matter of Hanyeh-ping" is so interesting and illuminating that it is well worth quoting in full. In its official English translation it runs as follows:

If in the future the Hanyeh-ping Company and Japanese capitalists agree upon coöperation, the Chinese Government, in view of the intimate relations subsisting between the Japanese capitalists and the said company, will forthwith give its permission. The Chinese Government further agrees not to confiscate the said company, nor, without the consent of the Japanese capitalists to convert it into a state enterprise, nor cause it to borrow and use foreign capital other than Japanese.

The language of this note is naïvely suggestive of the state of things existing in China ever since the more active commercial relations between China and foreign nations began to exist. While the Chinese compradore has been trained—chiefly under British influences—so that he rivals the best of any nation in business honor and competency, both the government and the people of China have never developed any commendable measure of either the disposition or the practical habit of honorable dealing with foreigners or with one another.

Those who remember how falsehood, intrigue, bribery of officials, hypocritical protestations and complainings, “law-ing,” and even violence and bloodshed, have accompanied quite persistently business rivalries in our own country, need not be greatly surprised if much of the same evils accompanies the similar rivalries of natives and foreigners in China. Or, as Mr. Inouye, the Japanese Ambassador in London pointed out in an article in the *London Times*, on the 14th of last February: “Such privileges cannot be considered to be in any way different from those granted to other powers.” They are of the same order as the French Agreement and Yangtze Agreement made in 1858.

Of the other class of demands, such as the agreement of China not to secure any foreign loan by pledging the taxes of Inner Mongolia, not to contract a foreign loan for the construction of any new railway in this Province, without consulting with Japan, a fair measure of justification may be derived from arguments touching the permanent interests of both countries. This is especially true of the proposal, favored warmly by China, that in future, not only in the Shantung peninsula, but everywhere, no concessions of islands or places on the coast of China shall be made to any foreign country. This pledges all the power of Japan to maintain the integrity of the Chinese seaboard; and it gives to all the rest of the world the right to interfere, should Japan herself try at any time to violate this principle of China’s integrity.

As to the articles in Group V it was the only fair way in prospect of their final just and amicable settlement that

Japan should consent to their being left as unfinished business—China pledging herself to a further discussion of them at some future date. Indeed, in the “Instructions Given” by Baron Kato (Minister of Foreign Affairs) to Mr. Hioki (Japanese Minister at Peking), bearing date of December 3d, 1914, the official English translations from which I am quoting expressly says:

As regards the proposals contained in the Fifth Group, they are presented as the *wishes* of the Imperial Government. The matters which are dealt with under this category are *entirely different in character* from those which are included in the first four groups.

And yet the detractors of Japan have seized upon this very group as especially suited to their purpose of bringing the ridicule and suspicion of foreign nations to bear against Japan.

Undoubtedly it is not nice, it is ridiculous, for either individuals or nations to offer to “whip” one another into preferring to take one another’s advice. And yet the statistics show that Japan has no little good reason to be sore upon this point. For, according to the latest information, the number of foreigners engaged by the Chinese Government in its various departments, either in the customs, railways, post-offices, or other branches, reaches a total of 3948 persons; but the nationality of these is distributed as follows: British, 1105; French, 1003; German, 533; Russian, 463; American, 174; Japanese, 207; Italian, 75; Austrian, 59; Belgian, 171; and others, 158. Surely, in comparison with the immensely greater number of its own national residents in China, and of the vast superiority of its economic, political, and other interests in China, and in the Orient, generally, Japan has some right to complain that its direct official influence in China is not correspondingly great. As we have already indicated, however, this is not a grievance to be remedied by force, but, the rather, by wisdom and watchful waiting and patient industry directed toward proving that advice valuable, or that the assistance which it designs to promote and guarantee, has in fact, already become quite necessary. For the time has not arrived, nor is it near at hand, when China can afford to rely upon her-

self alone to resist the evils which her weakness and corruption, and long-continued resistance to the call for self-reform, have rendered her liable to sustain and unable to combat.

The voice of that mysterious anonymous and yet omniscient person, "Our Far-Eastern Correspondent," is again making itself heard in the land, warning our business men, and our government in support of their interests, to "look sharp" and "get busy," lest Japan succeed in closing the "open door." The voice has statistics at its command, which are designed to show how rapidly the trade of Japan is relatively growing in Manchuria and China, and how the trade of the United States is relatively falling off. This same voice made the same charge some half-dozen years ago, and cited statistics from Manchuria to prove that the Japanese Government was dealing treacherously with the United States, by closing the open door in that province of China. But when we ourselves showed that the same thing was true at the same time, as proved by the trade statistics of the Phillipine Islands, and asked the very pertinent question whether this calamity also was chargeable to the Japanese Government, the New York paper which had published the article from its "Far Eastern Correspondent," refused to insert our article.

Pending the completion of the negotiations between Japan and China, and indeed before they had taken any appearance of a final shaping, the government at Washington addressed a not too polite and, in our judgment, rather premature note to the two countries, expressing its intention to interfere in behalf of the business interests of its own nationals, in case the negotiations ended in arrangements which were inconsistent, either with its now existing treaties, or with the territorial integrity of China, or with the principle of the open door. Now, there is just as good reason to assume that Japan is going to be faithful to her treaty obligations as that we are going to be faithful to our treaty obligations. There is danger in our undertaking in any way to guarantee the territorial integrity of China. The encroachments already made upon the sovereignty of

China by European nations are the chief existing sources of danger in that direction; our meddling in the politics of the Orient, except to protect the possessions which we have unfortunately and not altogether creditably acquired there, is likely to involve us in very serious complications with both the Western and the Eastern World. And we certainly cannot expect to interpret the vague policy of the "open door" so as to prevent Japan, or any other nation more favorably situated, or more concessive to the conditions of fair trade, or more enterprising and skillful in securing the advantages of an enlarged commercial intercourse, from getting the start of us in Manchuria and China. Perhaps, if our business men would wake up, inform themselves better, adapt themselves to existing conditions more adroitly, and open their own doors more generously, they would not need to solicit political intervention or political intrigue, to compete more successfully in the Orient with Great Britain and Germany as well as with Japan, for their part in the development of the resources of China.

We return, then, to the point of view suggested by the question of our Japanese friend, and referred to at the beginning of our article on "Japan in Korea." Most of the existing and more persistent misunderstandings which arise between Japan and America are likely to originate in the future, as they have in the past, under the inspiration and fostering of the members of both nations who have some self-interested, if not positively dishonorable purpose to promote. In both nations, such persons will surely continue to use all available means to secure their own interests at whatever cost to the good will toward each other of the two countries. And China will for some years to come offer the most fruitful field for such rivalries. Over the resources of China there will probably arise repeated appeals to the principle of the open door, and endless complications as to its practical interpretation. It will be of advantage, then, for Americans to know at once how the men of the "middle of the road" in Japan, at the present time, interpret this principle. For this purpose we quote the following passages from the *Japan Magazine*:

If America's stand is that Japan's demands contravene the Japanese-American Pacific Convention, it will be perfectly proper for her to request an explanation from Japan and make a formal protest on points she cannot agree to; and for Japan to give it due consideration. Japan may follow such a course morally for once, but only for once. The convention provides only for equality of opportunity for commerce, trade, investment of money, and for exploiting resources, but in no way concerns itself with political relations. But in places like Manchuria and Fukien, where Japan's relations to them are of a special nature, that fact must first be taken into full consideration in spite of the convention for equal opportunity. These relations are recognized by the Hay note, and are of the same character as the Russo-Mongolian, Anglo-Tibetan, and German-Shantung relations. If America finds this view of the matter unacceptable, that should be regretted; but it should not prevent Japan from pushing her negotiations on the lines she has mapped out for herself. Changes have come over the situation since the signing of the Convention, and if need be Japan may propose its revision, or adhere to her own interpretation of it, or revoke it altogether. Except for observing formalities, the Journal insists that Japan need pay no attention to American interference, if any is attempted.

In closing this survey of "Japan in the Orient," we gladly rise to the higher and safer than the merely commercial and economic point of view. Japan and the United States will not only be at peace with each other, but will resume their former relations of mutual self-respect and reciprocal admiration and friendly feeling, that requires no apology and tolerates no suspicion, when each treats the other in all relations according to that Golden Rule which in its essentials is the mandate for international as well as personal relations, both of Confucius and of the Founder of Christianity.